THE CENTURY FOUNDATION

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY?

Prospects and Challenges for Reversing Weapons Threats

10 April 2008

New York, New York

EVENT TRANSCRIPT

Featured Presenters:

Graham Allison

Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Professor of Government, Harvard University

Hans Blix

Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

President, World Federation of United Nations Associations

LAURENTI: Good afternoon. If I may welcome you to the Century Foundation's Arthur Schlesinger Boardroom – Arthur Schlesinger was a long time trustee of the Century Foundation, and the trustees decided to name this boardroom in his honor after his death last year.

We are pleased to join with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in hosting today's discussion, *Windows of Opportunity – Prospects and Challenges of Reversing Weapons Threats.*

But I first have one housekeeping question to ask of you, which is, please turn off your cell phones and other noisemakers that might interfere with the recording of today's discussion.

I'd like to ask Jürgen Stetten, the New York Office Director of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung to open our discussion.

STETTEN: Well, thank you very much, Jeff. I am afraid we can't turn off all the noisemakers, because we'll still want to keep eating. It's a distinct pleasure to be part

of this event, and team up once again with the Century Foundation at this distinguished panel discussion on how to reverse the weapons threats. For the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and myself, the privilege is actually two-fold.

First, today's discussion fits very well into what once turned into a dormant line of work at the Foundation, but which, in the last couple of years, has become again a priority for the Foundation's programs, and that is the issue of disarmament and weapons control policy.

In fact, when I asked my colleagues in headquarters two years ago whether the Foundation should be doing more work on disarmament and non-proliferation, I was greeted with a lot of skepticism. And people were asking me, aren't the days of the summits in Reykjavik and Helsinki long over? Haven't those who used to be called the rocket counters in the think tank world long been sent into retirement?

Well, just one year later, I actually had the privilege to be a participant in a huge conference that the German Foreign Office hosted in Berlin, and where Hans Blix gave a presentation. And wow, there were almost 600 people filling the room, not a few of them being legislators.

And I think what we are witnessing today is somewhat of a renaissance of an old debate in the making. Today, few would disagree that both the urgency of political debate on arms control and the potential for new momentum seem to be growing. Just look at the discussion at the recent NATO summit, or the talk about a Franco-British nuclear new alliance. But also, look at the surprises and the conversations that the proposal of the Nunn, Shultz, Perry and Kissinger quartet have generated.

I am happy – very happy, also, too, that we have two such renowned experts and players here at the table to share their perceptions of this discussion today with us. Which leads me to the second reason why I personally feel it a privilege, and that's because all the books that impressed me – from all the books that impressed me as a student, certainly Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* ranks on the very top end of the range. And I'm very curious to hear from him, Professor Allison, and from Hans Blix, whether what we are dealing with today in the field of weapon threats holds also – is also part of the critical look of the rational actor model that you wrote about in your book on the Cuban Crisis, back in 1971.

So I'm very much looking forward to a fruitful discussion, and hand back to Jeff, who will moderate the first part.

LAURENTI: Thank you, Jürgen. The issue of nuclear arms policy has long been one to preoccupy the Century Foundation in the last century, called the 20th Century Fund, and its first work on this was a book by Tom Schelling and Morton Halperin in 1960, and with a venerable history since. Just last year, after a conference at – and I see Paolo Cuculi here – the Italian Foreign Ministry had supported – the Foundation issued a book, *Breaking the Nuclear Impasse*, which in a sense, prefigures the discussion today, which looks to what may be the changing opportunities for action in this field.

And indeed, both of our panelists have, themselves, in recent years, been prolific producers of important thinking on this. Hans Blix, as Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, with *Weapons of Terror*, and Graham Allison with *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. Both books are available remaindered at your local bookstore. And Hans in now on a book tour with a new publication, *Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters*.

To start off our discussion, I will pose a question to each of our panelists – three pairs of questions – and then invite the participation, moderated by Jürgen, from all of our participants here in the room. And this issue of nuclear weapons threats is one that takes constantly new forms. Nuclear disarmament, arms control concerns, seemed largely to have faded from the public's mind, at least in the United States, with the end of the Cold War. A Cold War that – is what had fueled the nuclear arms race.

But clearly, nuclear arms fears have not gone away. Back in 1990, Secretary of State James Baker found that the one argument that mobilized public opinion – unlike "oil, oil, oil" – for confronting Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait was, nuclear weapons possession – nuclear arms that the U.S. was convinced the IAEA then, with its then extant monitoring system had not been able to find. And it was a major selling point for the elder Bush, on the Iraq policy.

Fast-forward a dozen years, and once again, it's the, quote "smoking gun of a mushroom cloud," that helped the younger Bush persuade the American public to war in 2003. And the specter of nuclear materials in the hands of terrorists, especially after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, nuclear material that might be provided by either corrupt or malevolent officials in nuclear weapons states, is a very real concern to many people, at least in the U.S. So let me start first with – from the U.S. – Graham Allison.

After seven years of a particularly militant U.S. administration on issues of nuclear dangers, and focused on proliferation and potential nuclear terrorism, how would you describe today the dimensions of the nuclear issue that have the most traction in the American political debate going into this year's Presidential election?

ALLISON: Thank you. Thank you, that's a good and difficult question. Let me try to answer you briefly, and then – if you remember back in 2004, in the first of the televised debates between the two candidates, President Bush and John Kerry, the moderator asked the question, what is the single most serious threat to American national security?

And Senator Kerry got to answer first, and he said, nuclear terrorism. And then the moderator turned to President Bush and said, and your answer? And he said, quote, "I agree with my opponent." That's the only time in this whole campaign that series of words was used in sequence by either candidate – by either candidate. So he said, I agree with my opponent that the single biggest threat to American national security is nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist network.

So in some sense, this issue had some salience in 2004. In 2008, so far, now that we're down to three finalists, if you go to the website of each of the three, you will see that they've thought about nuclear issues, they've thought about nuclear terrorism. They have, I think, rather similar views.

The – Obama has formally embraced this four horseman vision of Shultz, Kissinger, Nunn and Perry, that is, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Senator Clinton has not gone that far, and Senator McCain has said that he thinks that we should have significant reductions in the American nuclear arsenal.

So I would say that this is – these are views of senators who have some reason to be, as senators, voting on the Nunn-Lugar legislation each year or otherwise. They have not had that much public say in it so far. And I think one of the interesting questions is, if you look at the Clinton ad – not to read too much into the weeds of the campaign.

But the Clinton – one of her two or three most salient selling points, as they've crafted the campaign, is that she's ready on the first day – that she's prepared to be Commander in Chief.

And this ad about the 3:00 am phone call, which got so much play, is about some kind of a crisis which, undoubtedly, in the course of the campaign, will include, well, how about if there was a nuclear weapon, or how about if there were a nuclear explosion? So I suspect we'll see that ad re-run, especially by McCain, who will say he's even more prepared to take a decision, if he were to get a 3:00 am phone call.

So I think the issue is just beneath the surface. In the public conversation, I was saying to Hans before, for most Americans, it's just hard to believe what they don't know. I know many people here are ambassadors from other countries, but if you read last week's poll in *The Economist*, fewer Americans believe in evolution as the way in which human beings have done, than believe in unidentified flying objects.

LAURENTI: So the evolution of this issue, as it were, is one that may point to – if you suggest to Obama and in the Democratic field before him, Edwards and Richardson had also been raising again, for the first time in at least 20 years of Presidential politics, the specter of a nuclear free world.

Is that one that frightens folks elsewhere, Hans? What would you say the perception of the dangers are, seen from Western Europe, or seen from the Middle East, or South Asia or East Asia? How does the rest of the world see this collection of issues and threats?

BLIX: I think rather differently. I think that the 9/11 put a heavy imprint upon the debate and upon the attitudes in the United States.

Let me first comment upon what Graham said about the similar – the same response from Kerry and Bush, that yes, on this particular point, they were agreed. But as to the means of meeting them, they were very different. And I remember from that

debate that Kerry was groping with some sort of measuring rod, when should the U.S. take military action? And he was ridiculed, because the other side said that, you know, are we supposed to get some permission from the Security Council?

And I can see that also in the debate now, in the campaign, there are differences. Senator Obama has said that he will not hesitate to use U.S. armed force to respond to an attack, or to an imminent attack. That seems to be much more in line with what most international lawyers, I think, would interpret the U.N. charter.

So while there is, I think, a compact attitude in the U.S. on fearing their worst weapons in the worst hands, as President Bush said, the means of meeting this threat are very different.

Now, coming to the Europeans and the rest of the world – yes, of course, Europe has seen a lot of terrorism in the past, so it is not anything new. And I don't think there's anything like obsession that there is here. We have had the cases in the U.K., we have had it in Madrid and so forth, yes. And some of that is certainly identified with Al-Qaeda, but there is not the same obsession.

And if you go to other continents – I don't know them that well, but if you go to Africa, I think that most Africans would say they're afraid of small caliber weapons. As Kofi Annan, I think, rightly said, that small caliber weapons are the slow weapons of mass destruction in the world. They are not worried about the nuclear development.

In the Middle East, of course, it's a little different. Concern about Iran, it is clear that in Arab states, they've sort of digested Israel and that's there, and they all live in an Alice-in-Wonderland situation, which Israelis say, we will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and the Arabs don't want the Israelis to come out and say we have it, because that would change their political posture.

But it's clear that the Iranian – the evolution in Iran is one that worries the Arab states, not so much from the point of view of terrorism, as a direct threat.

And similarly, in the Far East, I think there is a concern about the weapons, but not so much about terrorism. But perhaps we get over to the threats of the state, the threat of the state. Because both in the case of Iran and the case of Korea, I think that the domino effects that would come, if there were to be a further evolution on the nuclear path, that would be very great.

LAURENTI: Well, let's take this question of nuclear terrorism for a second at Graham, and since you devoted your most recent book to that, really, how likely is it that nuclear materials can ooze from the weapons facilities of the nuclear arms states, and end of up in the hands of jolly jihadists, or other armed political groups that are looking for the mother of all terrorist battles? I mean, is this a somewhat hyped threat, or is this real and imminent?

ALLISON: Thank you, this is among my most favorite subjects, nasty as it is. And will you pass those around?

And my take is that this is a real, clear, present danger. And I think that people who have looked at the evidence, inside governments or intelligence communities, are essentially unanimous about this subject.

So if you read George Tenet, the fellow who was CIA Director for President Bush, in his memoir, he's got a chapter on this topic, in which he actually advances several stories, but reports the conclusion of his own, his personal conclusion, and of CIA, that this is Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's burning passion.

In this *Nuclear Terrorism* book, I organized my argument about this in two parts. Part One says, inevitable – it says if everybody keeps doing what they've been doing for the last decade – so, U.S., IAEA, Iran, North Korea – I'm making it to be more likely than not that a nuclear bomb explodes in one of the great cities of the world in the next – in the decade after 2004. So my just – hunch, or my best judgment, would be more likely than not. That's 51% or higher, by summer of 2014.

And in part one, I try to explain why that's the case, under five chapters. Who could do it, what could they do it with, where could they get it, when could they have it, how could they get it to the target.

The little chart I gave you is what the effects would be of a bomb that the U.S. actually thought was in New York City a month after 9/11, in an episode called Dragon Fighter – that's the name of an agent who reported that Al-Qaeda had got a bomb out of the former Soviet arsenal, had it in New York City, was about to explode it. You can read the rest of the story in the introduction to the book, but in any case, it was a false alarm.

That's the good news. But the bad news is that the U.S. government had no basis for not taking this threat entirely seriously. This was the occasion when Cheney, and lots of people who work in different agencies of the U.S. government, left Washington, you may remember, for several months after 9/11. He was always said to be off in his cave.

So that's the, how serious. I would say, extremely serious.

But the good news part of this is Part Two, that this is a preventable catastrophe. The subtitle says, *The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. And what's required to prevent it is an ambitious agenda, but all feasible and affordable. I tried to organize an agenda to that end under a doctrine of Three No's, so if you look at the back of this target chart here –

LAURENTI: It sounds very Chinese.

ALLISON: We're hoping to get the – actually, the Chinese edition of this *Nuclear Terrorism* book, it's going to be published next week. So maybe they'll like the doctrine.

But in any case, no loose nukes – that means, lock them all up as good as gold, to the standards of Fort Knox. So, no weapons, no material. No new nascent nukes means no new national enrichment or reprocessing – that is, making this stuff from which you can make a bomb. That's Iran. And no new nuclear weapons states means, stop with the eight – at the time I wrote it, now it's about eight and a half, North Korea being kind of the only self-declared but unrecognized nuclear weapons state – not to grandfather these folks forever, but to stop the bleeding before you go back to deal with the issue.

So, the concept here is that unlike, let's say, bioterrorism, or other acts of terrorism, on the supply side of this problem, there's a strategic narrow or chokepoint that if choked tightly enough, would reduce the likelihood to nearly zero, because terrorists are not going to make highly enriched uranium or plutonium. These are – this is a huge industrial undertaking.

They're not going to make them in a cave somewhere – they're going to buy weapons or material from some crook, who steals them from some – Pakistan, or Russia, or North Korea.

So I would say, extremely – extreme risk, a history-changing event. And again, for New Yorkers, I would say the – Tenet's chapter on this deserves reading. He gives a lot of texture to an episode in 2004, when Al-Qaeda operatives in New York appeared to be, just from the communication intercepts, which is what you can tell from the way he writes it – prepared to conduct a sarin gas attack on the U.S. subway, and the number two guy from Al-Qaeda – Zawahiri – so he hardly ever communicates directly with these guys – sent them a direct message, and said, cancel this operation now, we have something much more substantial in store.

So if you ask yourself, what would trump 9/11, I'd say the top of that pyramid is a nuclear bomb engulfing a city.

LAURENTI: Well, I do note from the map, that while the U.N. is blown away, this building is just outside the line, so that we would have to continue to report to work. (laughter)

ALLISON: I worked very hard on this last night, to get it to stop just before (laughter).

This comes from a website we put up in conjunction with the book – you can see up here, called nuclearterrorism.org. And you can put in your own zip code and see what (inaudible).

LAURENTI: Hans, the IAEA has been tightening its monitoring systems, but I don't think anybody would say that it's really capable of preventing proliferation among interested and eager states, or of being able to prevent nuclear materials leakage to non-state hands.

Now, is this something that states, inevitably, then, are going to have to fall back on their own national means to combat? How does one deal with these kind of threats,

given the gaps in the international system and weaknesses there, and also given the weakness of many national governments, of being able to cope with it?

BLIX: Well, I'm not so taken by arguments about inevitability of disasters. I remember after the Chernobyl accident, green people would come to me and the IAEA, and said, well, you said that there would not be a big nuclear catastrophe, but now we know that it will come every seven years, because it was seven years between the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl.

Now we have had 22 years since the Chernobyl accident, and I think it's – while you cannot say that the risk is zero, I think that to proclaim the inevitability is going too far. I think it also plays into a – it's a bit of a hyping. It plays into anxiety. Maybe we all, as individuals, we have a need for daily doses of anxiety, and I think Graham is very helpful in serving some of that to us, and there are many journalists, too, who do it as good copy. And there are many politicians who do it.

And I do not want – I cannot say the risks are zero, but I am more eager to discuss the remedies that Graham comes with, and where we will see eye to eye on a number of things. The risks are not zero, whether it has to do with nuclear catastrophes, or it has to do with nuclear weapons.

And that is that. The IAEA, in the beginning of the '90s, we invited member states to discuss, how can we reduce the risk of traffic? And there was interest, and – and this was the beginning of the '90s, so it's a long time ago. And I think that they have achieved a good deal since then. They put a lot of locks on their stores in Russia – it's not so easy to steal a bomb, any longer.

There were mature nuclear materials leaking out, some grams of plutonium from factories in Bulgaria, where they were producing smoke detectors. They used tiny, tiny quantities of plutonium, and some of that came out in the market. There were things stolen in the Russian bases up in the north – yes, there is some of that.

And of course, while the IAEA has listed what they have found and what they have stopped, what's been reported to them, there could have been more that the IAEA did not see. So I'm not denying that.

But much of it – most are these are sort of shams, actually, scams. They were crooks, Russian crooks, and especially the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when controls were not so tight, there were things going out, but not in large quantities.

And I am often wondering, who are the purchasers of this? Who are the buyers of it? Was it Libya, or the Iranians, or – yeah, the risk is there. We should reduce it, and that has been done quite a lot, at border controls, and quite a lot within Russia as well.

We have not seen – we've seen some Al-Qaeda people interested, and they're having contacts also with some Pakistani intelligence, and this is not without danger. I'm not saying so. But I agree with Graham that building up enrichment facilities, or

reprocessing – that's a big undertaking. That's far beyond them. Stealing, or buying a weapon, is also a very big undertaking, and there are some big worries about Pakistan, that they – if there were another regime, or if there were a shift in political power, it could be dangerous.

But what we hear, I think, reported, is that first of all, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are moderate Islamists, they're not extremists. And, secondly, that the military have always kept a very tight control.

So while again, the risks are not zero, I'm not overly worried about it. I'm much more worried about the case of Iran, and the case of North Korea, where I think diplomatic means and negotiation are indispensable, and should be further pursued. And there, we have not arrived, in either case.

But I think that when the U.S. in 2002, when they said goodbye to the agreed framework, and the North Koreans withdrew from the NPT, and opened up the reprocessing plant, that this was not the best of operations. At that time, we thought they might have had seven kilograms of plutonium, and I think today, the calculation is that they might have 45 kilograms of plutonium.

And so, I think a different approach then would have been – might have been better, and I'm applauding the approach they have today. After all, Seoul is within artillery range from North Korea. They don't need to threaten with nuclear weapons. Merely artillery is a danger.

In the case of Iran – I may touch upon that, too. I think that the Europeans started this with the United States as backseat driver for a long time, and the U.S. eventually came on board, although there are no direct negotiations. I think there was a mistake by the Europeans to make a precondition that Iran should suspend their enrichment. Because the whole subject is about Iran's enrichment program. And to say, then, that well, we will sit and negotiate with you, but first you suspend your program, is a bit of an awkward negotiation.

And even though one hears what are the carrots that may be offered on the Western side, support for getting into the World Trade Organization, etc., well, these are interesting features. But I do belong to those who think that there should be direct talks between the two, and in particular, two elements have not been on the table in the case of Iran, as have been on the table in the case of North Korea, and one is the commitment not to attack Iran by military means, or to try to achieve regime change. Both these elements are on the table in Beijing.

And the North Koreans thus have a choice – what do they think is best for that production, or that regime, and country – a nuclear bomb, or a commitment of this kind? So that's one element.

The other one is similar, opening up for North Korea to participate in the world – diplomatic relations both with Japan and with the United States. And I have not heard, at any rate, that this should have been on the table in the case of Iran.

So it seems to me that the diplomatic path, means have not been exhausted in either case. I'm more worried about these cases than I can say, the grave dangers of domino effects in both of them if we do not succeed in them.

LAURENTI: Let me now switch the discussion a bit, Graham, to the questions of the nuclear weapons arsenals in the hands of the acknowledged nuclear weapons states. Do the levels of nuclear weapons really matter very much, assuming that the possessing state has tight controls to guard against leakage or diversion? What's the level below which either the U.S. or the Russian nuclear and military establishments would really push back against further reductions, and at what point, if you're thinking about a nuclear reduction program, do you have to begin to involve the other nuclear weapons states, both the acknowledged ones and the wink-and-a-glance nuclear weapons states?

ALLISON: Again, an extremely complicated issue. I agree with Hans that mostly, we have these two raging fires in effect, if I put it dramatically, in the case of North Korea, which had approximately two bombs' worth of plutonium when President Bush came to office, and now has approximately ten or nine bombs' worth of plutonium, having conducted a test. And Iran, which I think is completely serious about building up the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program.

So, how to connect that to this other picture about American nuclear weapons, or Russian nuclear weapons, or Chinese nuclear weapons, or British? There, as we were talking before, this conversation has begun to become enlivened again, substantially as a result of the OpEd – the two OpEds written by the so-called four horsemen. So for people that haven't been following this, let me refer you to it.

It's just an OpEd in the *Wall Street Journal* in January of '07, then again in January of '08, and it has both a vision and a specific agenda. The vision, which they call for the U.S. government and other governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and then they have a – 13 areas with specific recommendations.

This proposal, I think, last had any political salience at all in the U.S. under the banner of the campaign for nuclear disarmament, or something. So this is a – generally regarded as a left-wing Council of Livable Worlds agenda.

But the four people who authored this are four of the bluest chips in the American Cold War establishment that you could find – George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and Bill Perry. There's not four better ones than those, I would say.

So how do these things connect? I've been – I'm schizophrenic, I think, if I were to tell the truth. So when I was writing the *Nuclear Terrorism* book, the question arose, so you have this doctrine of the Three No's: no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, no new nuclear weapons states. What about your weapons? They should have a fourth one – no nuclear weapons.

And I'm thinking about this with some colleagues back in the '80s. I co-authored a book called *Fateful Visions*, in which we explored the next 25 or 50 years, in 10 different visions that have been presented. And the obstacles to – since you can't disinvent nuclear weapons, we're then, always, going to live in a world in which nuclear weapons can be reconstituted. So the obstacles always seem, to me, to be too large.

So in this *Nuclear Terrorism* book, what I say is, devalue nuclear weapons. Try to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs. No nuclear tests, or CTBT makes extremely good sense. No production of new fissile material – that's the fissile material cutoff. No first use – I mean, I don't regard that as significant, except that it has some play publicly. So I would say, all those kinds of No's. But I didn't get my way all the way to the end of this game.

Now, I'm – as I say, I'm more schizophrenic than I was when I wrote the book back in '04, because when I ask myself, who has better judgment about this issue – me, or these four guys, I'd say – hm. (laughter) Generally, their record has been better than mine, so I think that one now has to reengage this issue, and reexamine it.

M: (inaudible).

(laughter)

ALLISON: I think that the – just to conclude, I think that the question of by what criteria should you assess visions – I have a tennis opponent who's a doctor. And he says, when people talk with him about visions, he prescribes medicines. (laughter)

So I don't quite know how – by what criteria. And then the second is, now I'm doing – so that I won't sound like just the choir. I mean, I'm now doing the Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday half of my schizophrenia, rather than on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, I would be signed up completely to Hans' agenda, which is very consistent with the four horsemen, actually. And the Blix Commission before, and the Canberra Commission were already there in earlier incarnations.

So I'd say, on the other side, there are substantial obstacles that need to be debated and addressed and answered, if this is to be realistic.

I like – to the extent that the vision motivates the agenda of the four horsemen, I'm for it, because the agenda seems to me precisely right. And there should be an urgency about the agenda.

But when I think about the idea, embracing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, which is actually what the U.S. signed up to in the non-proliferation treaty, so this is not a radical new idea – I still have to ask myself, OK, if a magic wand – by some magic wand, it was possible to eliminate all nuclear weapons today, somebody does that, or you could eliminate the knowledge of how to reconstitute nuclear weapons. Now you're into way off in science fiction for me. I don't see how that's realistic.

So then, every state of the world is some number of days or weeks or months away from the same old arsenal I had before that you didn't like. So that's proposition one.

Proposition two, since I'm not quite sure of John maybe rebuilding his arsenal, and we're each, say, one month or one week or one year away, I'm watching him all the time, saying, do you think he may be getting prepared to start this timetable? And he's looking at me saying, he's looking at me suspiciously.

This crisis instability was one of the topics we studied a lot during the Cold War. I mean, if you go back to the World War I hypothesis, this fear of kind of competitive advantage – if you mobilize your troops before I mobilize mine, and if you get your troops to the front before I get mine, actually was one of the significant factors in the World War I story. So breakout and crisis instability is an issue to be addressed.

A second one, which – I think I'd be interested in Hans' view From an American point of view, imagine all nuclear weapons were eliminated. So, by magic, something happened. Is the U.S. stronger, or weaker?

Well – so, as one of my Russian friends says, you're in favor of this because you want to make the world safe for a rogue non-nuclear superpower, to go around bombing people, when you don't like what they're doing in Kosovo, or changing their regime when you don't like what they're doing in Iraq.

LAURENTI: Well, we do it anyway, so (laughter).

ALLISON: But as my Russian friend says, but the reason why he feels more comfortable they're not coming to Russia is, they know that would be suicidal for the, quote, crazy Americans.

LAURENTI: Graham, there are meds that deal with schizophrenia, too. (laughter)

But my question to you dealt with those Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays when you are negative, or skeptical about the nuclear elimination vision. My question didn't deal with nuclear elimination. On those days, you'd say the existing nuclear arsenals are fine, or is there still something to lower the –

ALLISON: No, I think that – the nuclear –

LAURENTI: That was the –

ALLISON: The nuclear arsenals are grotesque, make no sense whatever, were built up over a period of a Cold War without any good understanding of how many weapons were needed. So nobody whom I know at STRATCOM, or the people who do nuclear – they have 2,000 weapons, they can do everything they want to do.

LAURENTI: OK, so that's the number.

ALLISON: Maybe 1,000, or maybe 1,500. How many times do you need to – you know, how much times over? And I think the fact that – Fred Iklé, actually, who was Reagan's Under Secretary for Policy, has a good metaphor for this. He says, if a Martian strategist were watching Earth now, and the nuclear arsenals, she might actually not know that the Cold War got over, because the arsenals look kind of like these crazy arsenals we had in the Cold War, more or less.

Now, that's not quite right, but there's still thousands of weapons. There's still hundreds of these weapons kept on very short alert. There's still layers and layers of such items, even though mercifully – mercifully, the motivation that would lead the Russian or U.S. – so I would say, mostly the conversations I hear say, Moscow Treaty is 2,250 deployed weapons, but there's then kind of a huge amount of weapons in storage.

Mostly, I think somebody like Cartwright, who was STRATCOM, would – I don't know, I don't want to speak for him. But I'd say mostly people in that community don't imagine they need more than 2,000 weapons.

LAURENTI: OK. That, I think, takes us to our last question from this segment of the –

BLIX: There's one little to add –

LAURENTI: Well, yes. The last segment – in this segment of our conversation today, before we engage everyone in the room, and that is, then, Hans, having heard this, what is your assessment of the international community at large's willingness to play ball on American proliferation concerns, if we don't deal with the concerns about nuclear rollback or elimination? Is that sustainable – is a two-tier world sustainable, and if it isn't, this kind of pie-in-the-sky vision, as some – as Monday – no, it's Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday, Graham would view it – this pie-in-the-sky vision. How do you create a reliable system of enforcing a nuclear-free world, once you think you've gotten people there?

BLIX: Well, I'm glad to hear that Graham is trying so hard to move from schizophrenia to sanity. (laughter)

And actually, I don't – I would say, I agree with my opponent, (laughter) if you were my opponent, but you really are not. And many of the measures –

ALLISON: At least, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. (laughter)

BLIX: Any of the measures that you enumerate here, I agree wholeheartedly with. And when it comes to the question of the vision, I have also labored with that. I'm not – I'm not very schizophrenic about it. I'm not so terribly interested in that part of the problem.

This is far away, and I hear from my friends who are in this movement that are abolitionists, that yes, we need the vision, we must be able to tell the public that this is

where we are going. And OK, that's fine, but it's far away. Just as now, my friends in the U.N. and international organizations say we should aim for a world federation.

Well, all right, I agree to that too, but that's far away, and we have problems here and now. And these are the ones that we should deal with – we should not be sidetracked into the discussion about whether some Russians sit in a cave, and they are sitting on top of them, have a nuclear weapon, or someone else does that. We have to deal with the CTBT and question on whether we can get to the – or, you can get the U.S. Senate to review its position and ratify the CTBT. In that case, I think China will, and if China will, I think India will, etc., and there will be a virtuous circle.

And we have a – as Graham mentioned, we have a cutoff agreement, and I think that also – if you have the problem of the nuclear agreement with India, and an agreement with India which would enable them to use more of their indigenous uranium to enrich it to a higher level – at least, it could be suspected by the Pakistanis and the Chinese that it would be done. If that – if you were to have a FMCT, a cutoff of production of fissile material, nuclear enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons – with verification, I think that would also help to reduce the concern about the Indian nuclear – in the U.S.

The problem is, as we've had – although we've had this numerical reduction of the number of weapons we have, we have, at the same time, had a widening, I think, of the license to use them in the nuclear doctrines. The French, too, have come out and said that they would be ready to use nuclear weapons in response to a terrorist threat. And so, the non-first-use has gone down, and the Russians, who were on that, they now also say that they could use nuclear weapons first. This is an evolution that has gone in the wrong direction.

We admit that the levels have gone down – that's fine. It's better with 27,000 nuclear weapons than 55,000. But when the nuclear weapons states say that, look, this is what we've done, we have really lived up to the NPT of nuclear disarmament. But non nuclear weapons states will say that, well, you are doing away with some of your expensive redundancy, there's not much more than that.

And you are actually saying that, it is we who are the danger. You have the nuclear weapons, you are no danger, because nuclear weapons are in good hands here. It's if they get into the hands of the rogue states or other dangerous types, then it is dangerous.

So we – those who don't have it, they are the dangers, but you are not the danger. And indeed, they will also say that, look, you are asking us – now, you're saying, if we had more nuclear power in the world, there would be more enrichment plants, and that would be a latent danger of leakage, etc.

So that was actually a loophole in the NPT. We should have had a ban on enrichment plants, and we should now try to plug that hole somehow. But at the same time, while you want to deprive other states – non nuclear weapons states of enrichment plants,

you yourself are not even willing to go along with the verification, with the CTBT cutoff, and the verification of it.

So it's a double moral. That's the two-tiered system that you have, and I think it would be very hard, if not impossible, to persuade the non nuclear weapons states to confirm and bend further on this two-tiered system.

Now, on the four horses, which we have – in fact, there's a Swedish saying that when the Devil gets old, he becomes religious. (laughter) And then, it's just tempting to think of that saying, but I have met them. And I feel they are very sincere.

I was on a platform together with George Shultz in San Francisco a few days ago, and I think he's absolutely sincere. I think that the impression he had from the meeting in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev – yes, this was something indelible in him. And he really goes wholehearted for it, and I think he has succeeded very well, and I'm happy that the 7th of January – that OpEd that they had in the Wall Street Journal has got such traction. It's a lot of people now that are behind this.

And as someone said here a couple of years ago, using the word disarmament was a fairly dirty word, and foundations were not giving any money for any discussion of disarmament. The State Department, as John probably knows, I don't think there is anything – any division called disarmament any longer.

That is coming back, and it's becoming, I think, more – the administration, too, they put forward a text after all, a cutoff treaty in Geneva, and one without verification. But nevertheless, that was a text put on the table. So it is not something totally distant from them, and in a year's time, if you – another administration, whether it be a Republican or whether it be a Democrat, I think there is much greater hope for this than there was before.

Now, what is the alignment, you asked me, in Europe and other places? Well, I think that in some parts of Europe – most parts of Europe – there are open doors. The U.K., I think, among the nuclear weapons states, is the country that has been the most positive. You had Margaret Beckett last summer, at the Carnegie international meeting in Washington that came out with a remarkably favorable speech about nuclear disarmament.

And then you had the British Defense Secretary, went to the Conference on Disarmament not so long ago, and he said, it's the main point. I am Defense Secretary, yes, and from these points of view, that we want to move ahead.

So I think that – and even the French, as Sarkozy has said only a few days ago, that he favors CTBT, and he'd favor, also, a cutoff agreement. Well, the French are otherwise viewed as the most reluctant – reluctant people to go for disarmament.

If you take Germany, yes – I'm sure my neighbor on my left here knows more about the Germans, it's also very favorable. You have such an issue as removing the nuclear weapons from western Europe, NATO weapons on the one hand, and removing the

Russia – further into the Russian territory, which I think has a strong support among public opinion in Europe. I do not quite understand why NATO has to keep these weapons– they say sometimes that this is necessary, the glue to keep your alliance together.

Well, I don't know. It seems to me that they're expanding the alliance all the time, they all say (laughter) hooray, Albania has now joined the alliance.

So Germany I think, and the other European states are, too. Now, coming to Russia, it's a different cup of tea. I think in Moscow, I think disarmament has a certain dirty, bad ring, as it has had in Washington in the past. They have felt that they're – they've been stepped on their toes for a long time, and they feel that now it's time for us to sort of recuperate a bit, and they don't pay any attention to us unless we are moving in the other direction.

Whether they will be charmed by a new administration that would come out and say, now, we think that we should reduce these dangers, I don't know. I shall be in Moscow Monday next week, and I hope to learn something about it.

And in my Commission, we had Alexei Arbatov, who was a superb, knowledgeable person, and extremely liberal. But he tells me that he is sort of the very tiniest minority.

The Chinese – well, they are pragmatic on this, and I would feel less worried about them than about the Russians. But we'd like to see the ouverture from the side of the U.S., and I think that's very well worth it, and see the negotiations reopen next year.

LAURENTI: Well, now we will turn the program over to all of you. Jürgen Stetten will moderate. When Jürgen recognizes you, please wait until you get the microphone, and begin by stating your name and affiliation. So, Jürgen?

STETTEN: Yes, we'll proliferate the questioning to the floor, and please raise your hand. If I don't know you, I please apologize, and just identify yourself briefly, please.

CUCULI: Thank you. Good afternoon. I'm Paolo Cuculi from the Permanent Mission of Italy, to the U.N. And if anybody – I've been dealing with disarmament for a relatively short time, which is since 2000, but if anybody knows a doctor who can cure depression for people in the disarmament field, I would appreciate that. (laughter)

Very briefly, on the several key questions which were raised, about division. I think we need to agree that there should be one register, when we talk. Either we talk about principles, or we talk about pragmatism. There is a problem, and it seems to me quite evident today, discussions on disarmament and non proliferation coming from a no nuclear weapons state, that there is the tendency to shift from general principles to pragmatic considerations according to the circumstances. And this does not necessarily help the understanding of the others.

So, nuclear disarmament is in the NPT. The process must lead to nuclear disarmament and to complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Now, if we say that that would undermine the national security of nuclear weapon country X, then we must accept that no nuclear weapons, taking into account the fact that one of the three pillars of the NPT is gone, may first wish to reconsider whether it's worth staying in that treaty, or perhaps for no nuclear weapons states who are, let's say, incidentally in the Middle East, and incidentally have all basically all the neighbors who are nuclear weapons states, or where there are troops from nuclear weapons states, and which are on a particular blacklist, and which are not particularly liked, but some of the nuclear weapons states could pragmatically believe that. Perhaps building a couple of bombs would put you in a better situation.

So that, for the most extreme. On the other extreme, I believe that if we want to sell new priorities and new ideas, nuclear terrorism is one of these ones, and I fully agree with Dr. Blix. Whenever, in the U.N., you speak about those issues, the reply you get for countless delegations, in particular from Africa, is that that's simply not an issue for us. We don't care about that. We don't know what is control list, what is a dual use issue. We have a problem with machine guns, with Beretta rifles and whatever.

So if we want to sell new issues, we must try to take into account of old priorities. I mean, if you have an old cancer, the fact that you don't look after an old cancer because you have pneumonia, doesn't improve your general health, but rather, make it worse.

So we have, first of all, what do non nuclear weapons states care about today? Yes, non-proliferation, it is a priority for some of them, Italy, western countries. Peaceful use of nuclear energy is the priority.

Now, I have the impression that if I take a look at the preventable catastrophe, the three bullets, there is a tendency to make a photograph of this situation – sorry, a photograph. No new enrichment plants – why should I accept as a good non-proliferator not to have enrichment plants or reprocessing plants? Come and verify.

So the final issue is, we need equal standards to be safe. Everybody, we need to reinforce previous agreements which were taken, priority for disarmament, strong verification. Without that, all the system goes down, and we are in a worse position.

Sorry.

STETTEN: Thank you very much. I think we'll take two more before we give it back to the podium, please.

And please be brief. I know this set a bad precedent, kind of. (laughter)

BURROUGHS: I'm John Burroughs from the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy. You know, I think it's true that the day when there is confident control of weapons and

fissile materials is far off. That's really a demanding task. And it is important to look at what can be done under present circumstances.

And the authors of the *Wall Street* Op-Eds did a service in a very difficult climate in kind of changing the nature of discussion. That is – and that's very much to their credit.

However, in 1999 or thereabouts, Paul Nitze wrote an Op-Ed in which he basically said the United States should give up its reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of what other countries do. You really don't see anything like that in the *Wall Street Journal* Op-Eds, to the effect that the United States should reduce its spending on its nuclear weapons infrastructure, should stop warhead modernization, should change its doctrines, except insofar as those things can be done by agreement or coordination with Russia.

And it seems to me that the fundamental problem we face is not really one of speculating about the exact conditions of a nuclear weapon free world. The fundamental problem is ending reliance upon and valuing of nuclear weapons.

And I think that the *Wall Street Journal* OpEd has opened up the terrain for debate, but I think that much more needs to be done in that fundamental way.

STETTEN: Thank you. We can take one more at this point. Please?

TOMERO: Leonor Tomero, with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, based in Washington, DC. My question is related to the first one we heard about, is, how do we deal with the revived interest in sensitive fuel technologies, and reprocessing, uranium enrichment?

It seems that several factors have contributed to this shift in recent years – for example, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which the Bush administration has announced, and has been signing up international partners to, which supports reprocessing. And of course, the United States has given India the authorization to reprocess in the U.S.-India 123 Agreement for Cooperation.

So as we move forward, what do you think the best way is to either – can we prevent the proliferation of these sensitive fuel technologies, and how can we best do so? Thank you.

STETTEN: Thank you very much. I think we'll bring it back to the podium. They were – one question was on, and we haven't touched on it yet, how healthy really is the U.N. machinery that exists in the disarmament business, most notably the NPT? Is it actually a medicine, or is it a patient? And I think the other questions were what else can be done on the four horsemen's proposal, or needs to be done, and then the fuel question.

Professor Allison, would you like to start, or Mr. Blix?

BLIX: Well, I think the NPT is a platform. It does have this famous double bargain with the non nuclear weapons states committing themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states committing themselves to nuclear disarmament, and eventually, also, general and complete disarmament.

So that's a question of building on that, now. What are the measures we are taking to strengthen the non-proliferation pledge, whether we will have an additional protocol ratified by everybody, or some other measure making it more difficult to withdraw from the treaty? And on the other hand, the measures that are – that we talk about, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a cutoff agreement, and so forth. I think that is a U.N. machinery we may also need more to have a secretariat for the NPT, but this is more technical.

But I think there is one element that has been missing from our discussion, and is also a part, a very important part of it. In the European Security Doctrine, they say that the best approach to prevent proliferation and prevent the growth of nuclear weapons is to strengthen – to make states feel that they don't need them. And this is in the realm of foreign affairs, and the realm of the relations between states. And I think that here, we have seen a lamentable evolution from the beginning of '90s until now.

The first half of the '90s was positive. We had – let's see, there were the Chemical Weapons Convention, we had the prolongation of the NPT, and we had a draft on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And since then, I think we've gone downhill.

And we have now a situation in which the relations are souring between the great powers. We hear about more authoritarianism in Russia, et cetera, no one is going to feel untouched by the fact that the media are not as free as they were, there’s a certain amount of gangster and so forth.

However, I think we should always be aware that some of the policies from the West have triggered some of this. When I'm looking at the NATO – my country is not a part, a member of NATO, and I don't think we should join NATO, either. But we see the expansion of NATO – I fully understand that the Baltic states that were occupied by Russia, or Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, were also, in reality, occupied by Russia – that they saw a need to get in, though I think it would have been better if they had come into the European Union, and they would also have had security.

Now, I hear Senator Lugar, who I think is a very respectable and moderate man – he said in Riga last year that he thought that NATO should be open to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It's not only Ukraine and Georgia, but also Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. And I read the Generals in NATO writing a memorandum in which they always say, ooh, the democratic states, at least those in the Northern Hemisphere, should be there. So I take it that means also South Korea and Japan.

Now, here it seems to me to be a revival of the containment policy – at least, the Russians must see it as a revival of the containment policy. Not only are they loyal members of NATO, they also have the listening devices or the missile shield in Poland

and Czech Republic, which started as a bilateral affair and gradually became a European and also a NATO affair.

And then, we have the southern containment policy, as I read it at any rate, with the US making a nuclear agreement with India, which will enable India to enrich more uranium, and I think it's said apparently openly by politicians in the U.S. that yes, India will be linked, then, to the U.S. in a strategic relationship, and we'll have Australia, hopefully – although a little more difficult with this Labour government in Australia than with the four previous governments, and Japan, and South Korea.

So here, again, against China, there's a containment policy. To me – I may be a naïve idealist, but I think that we have come so far in interdependence between the states that what we badly need is to integrate Russia and China as much as we can, with the deficiencies that they have, is to integrate them into the international organization, whether the WTO, or whether in the U.N. that has many weaknesses.

So I think we are going in the wrong direction, and that worries me very much. If we were to have a greater division, I see some reversal of attitudes in Washington. I think they have felt that the Russians know well, what the hell, Putin blew his top in Munich and that was terrible. What's going on here? And I think that they have changed course a little bit.

So this, I think, is a great, great worry. Now, another word about the two points, one about the energy that was mentioned here.

And I – one point that strikes me is that, when you talk about so many weapons, what are the weapons for? I mean, in the past, there were conflicts, and you wanted to defend yourself, and wanted to do something about the conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, we don't have a world with Communism that is expanding. During the Cold War, yes, then a free world needed protection. I think to NATO and the U.S., the nuclear weapons were helpful. But after the end of the Cold War, I don't see that happening. So what are the potential conflicts?

Taiwan is a flash point, yes. But will there be a nuclear war? Will there be a great power war about Taiwan? I don't know. What, can we have world wars about the emission of carbon dioxide, or can we have world wars about the exchange rate for the Chinese currency? I don't see that happening.

So what, really, are we fighting about? Energy, yes. Oil, yes. Raw material, competition, China needs more raw material in Africa. And India, also, (inaudible). But is it likely that this will really come to a belligerent contest? Is it not more likely that we'll have it fought out, rather, in prices? And the price of oil has already gone up rather well. Isn't it – that more likely?

Now, there will be a shortage of energy. There will be a shortage of more raw materials when both China and India require more. And of course, I am as much in favor of peaceful nuclear power as I am against nuclear weapons. I think that while no one is against solar power, or wind power, or fusion, or what have you,

nevertheless, nuclear power is the element that today could give us much, much more energy. That, together with a more effective use of energy, yes, that is vital.

So that, I think, is another dimension, I shall not plead that more. But only to end by saying that there is the worry that if you use more nuclear power, then you need more enriched uranium, you may need more enrichment plants, and what the U.S. proposal for a GNEP, which is one that we would not sell nuclear fuel, but you would lease it, and then take back the spent fuel. Well, that may be a hard thing to get the U.S. Congress to accept, taking back spent fuel, and throwing away nuclear waste in this country.

But nevertheless, there are a number of proposals in this area, and it's valid. I don't think that there's a problem today, except that Iran is doing enrichment. I don't see other plans for enrichment except in the United States and in France. It is otherwise, and they, I think, they can supply the market for a good long time to come.

But here is an active discussion that's going on in the IAEA, and that is as it should be. I think we can manage it.

STETTEN: Thanks. Graham Allison, maybe to add to the question from John Burroughs, that what would be the forum that the U.S. would actually use if this initiative of the four horsemen would gain any traction? Would this be some kind of an agreement among the established boys' club of nuclear powers, or would this be something in a more multi-lateral framework?

ALLISON: OK, so there are about 11 questions here, let me just try to deal with a couple of the items. (laughter)

First on the – if I understood the question, it was, why not unilaterally the U.S. reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons, which has been a proposal that recycles from time to time? The four horsemen explicitly reject that, on the proposition that if I were Hitler or Stalin, and had a big nuclear arsenal and you had none, I might coerce you. And that's not an implausible idea, I think, in terms of international politics.

Secondly, on the point that Hans made, again, this is on the Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday Allison, but if you ask yourself, if you're a Serbian, or a Russian, or an Iraqi, it appears that there's a state which, from time to time, decides that you're a bad guy, and maybe a member of an Axis of Evil, that proscribes regime change as the treatment. And it actually goes and topples Saddam.

And lest this be just President Bush, let's remember – we generally, Europeans and Americans, celebrate the fact that the U.S. engaged in bombing Belgrade to get events to develop in Kosovo. So if I'm a state whom I think may be in your bad graces, I at least have an incentive to have a security blanket. And I think that's why this nuclear agenda ends up getting intertwined with, basically, international politics.

And I think your point, Hans, that you made about trying to – the European Defense Policy proposition, one's got to work on the motivation side, as well as on the others.

Thirdly, let's imagine I'm the supreme leader in Iran, or Kim Jong-il. If you eliminate – or Osama. If you credibly eliminate your nuclear weapons, how does this affect my valuation of nuclear weapons? I'm thinking from my cave in Waziristan, well, fair is fair, you know? They got rid of their weapons, we shouldn't try to seek weapons.

Actually, from a rational actor's point of view, back to what Jürgen said before, nuclear weapons look better if you have no nuclear weapons, than if I have – than if you have some.

So the elimination of weapons by the states that have them don't necessarily devalue the weapons for the states that might want them, or to the states that might seek them. So then, that gets us back into the complexity of the connection between this agenda and international politics.

Finally, on the enrichment, I think the – if you were just, again, looking at the system in the large, and you said nuclear power, nuclear energy, is going to be part of the renaissance for meeting energy demands, especially in a greenhouse gas constrained environment, if states build nuclear power plants, they may want to be assured supplies of fuel, and so, the can build enrichment facilities. That's the uranium story, despite the fact that the basic economics of it don't work. So unless I'm supplying 30 or 40 reactors, as an economic proposition, this makes no sense, the uranium proposition.

So can the international community create a framework of assured nuclear fuel, so that if I'm the operator of the nuclear power – nuclear energy plant in Tehran, I'm sure I'm not going to get cut off from fuel?

And what the IAEA has been working on very actively – and I think, actually, it's been making some significant progress – is trying to work out an arrangement in which the first state will, in effect, lease the fuel, so that's the deal for the Russians and Bushire – so they provide the fuel, they take the spent fuel away. That there'll be guarantees from other countries, suppliers, that if one of the countries cuts you off, I'm guaranteeing to fill in. And then, you'll have some kind of IAEA fuel bank of last resort, which actually, interestingly, got started as an idea with Warren Buffett putting $50 million of his own money on the table to say, OK, I'll pay for one third of it, you guys go get the rest. And the U.S. has put in $50 million, and I think it was $5 million recently from –

BLIX: Norway.

ALLISON: From Norway, yeah. So there's $45 million going. So anyone here can make this happen.

STETTEN: Thanks. Ambassador?

NEY: Martin Ney, Ambassador of Germany and Deputy Perm Rep. Thank you very much for this invitation, and excellent presentations. To look at the doctor's appointment, I

think arms control is somewhat in trouble, and we need to rethink, and our colleagues from the CD might have to ask for a collective doctor's appointment to get treatment for depression.

I was very much inspired by your three points, Graham, and they are very convincing. When looking at them, I think we have to stop and rethink, to find and strike a good balance between a confrontative approach on non-proliferation, and a cooperative approach on non-proliferation.

When you look at the three points, first one, no loose nukes. To cite an example, you need to develop jointly an approach. That's certainly a cooperative element.

Then on the second point, no new nascent nukes. We must insist on intrusive inspections. That sounds much more confrontational. When we need to add the regime on non-proliferation, we need to seek consensus. That's, by definition, cooperative.

On no nuclear weapons states – no new nuclear weapons states, and we say, no more. There, we really run into difficulty. Is it a confrontational note, or is it one that we must persuade others to come on board in your regime, which is cooperative? And when we look at the approach that the United States took since the framework agreement on the 14th of October, 1994 until today, we had a swing back and forth between confrontation and cooperative.

So I think we need to rethink to what extent, and how far did we get with the confrontational approach? How far did we not get? To what extent do we need a more cooperative approach, and how far could we get approaching this?

And the second question is, can we really choose to be confrontational here and cooperative there, or do we need to consist – and somewhat consistency in our approach? That is a question, I think, to both. I would thank you very much.

STETTEN: Yes, we have – please, the gentleman away?

WOLF: John Wolf. I'm President of Eisenhower Fellowships. I didn't understand that, because I think you have to be both cooperative and confrontational at the same time. People cheat, and when they cheat, you've got to deal with it. People – rogues within the system from states violate international norms. If you look at the A.Q. Khan Network, you have to confront, and you have to confront the states that cooperated, to draw them into a cooperative network.

So I think you've got to work with both hands. You can't tie one hand behind your back.

Graham, I think your three points are also very good, but I think from the U.S. point of view, we would probably have to do some – there's – you said earlier, and I think you were right, there's not a reason why we can't take a first step. Leadership means leading, and to get anywhere in this situation, I have a suspicion that if the United

States simply says we will agree when everybody else agrees, then we will have the kind of endless debates that take place in the CD, with no progress ever likely.

So if you took a U.S. step that was bold, in dealing with weapons that we probably don't need to keep in the bunkers, and if you had a pos attraction type of agenda, something along the lines of that, including some of your subticks, especially in the second point, and you went out – I probably would stay away from established forums, and I would try to pull together a coalition of people, and then widen it out.

But that's to be debated. I probably wouldn't do it with too many traditional arms control negotiators, but on the other hand, I wouldn't negotiate an agreement like the U.S.-India agreement with nobody involved.

So you need to go forward, but the United States has to lead in order to get, I think, any progress.

STETTEN: Henry Sokolski? Yes?

SOKOLSKI: You know, there are some trends that –

M: Well, you have to introduce yourself.

STETTEN: Yes.

M: You don't have to.

SOKOLSKI: No, no, I do. These are new people.

M: You're John Wolf

SOKOLSKI: Henry Sokolski, Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center. First, Jeff, wonderful lunch – really interesting.

LAURENTI: Glad you like it.

SOKOLSKI: Great digs – this is nice.

It seems to me that all the speakers make a kind of concession to something that they ought to recognize a little more explicitly, and that is, there are some trends that are blowing in a direction that has made the door that they're trying to push relatively open anyway, and that is military science.

Military science has pushed in the direction of making three quarters to two thirds of the weapons in the Russian and the American stockpiles literally go away, or not be deployed – in some cases, melted down. And it wasn't really because some arms controller whispered in somebody's ear, hey, you've got to get rid of these things.

The arms controllers, rather, exploited that trend, and that's a good thing. And I think, certainly, Graham Allison understands exactly what I'm talking about, having advised Mr. Weinberger on competitive strategies and pushing precision guidance and revolutions in military affairs.

So it seems to me, you want to follow that trend. And the one thing that might prevent that trend from getting its due is proliferation. After all, at some point, countries, will say – like Sarkozy just recently said, well, if they spread, we have to keep our nuclear powder dry, maybe we need more.

Well, everyone's going down, for the most part, with the exception of the question marks in India, Pakistan, and China, but they're question marks, thankfully, still. All right? So we're not in a terrible way, quite yet.

This leads to two questions. There's another trend, which nobody much bothers to follow. It's called economics. By the way, diplomats have a hard time with this. They don't like numbers.

But the economics of nuclear power, just basically the capital costs – don't get into the waste, or all of the other things that you can conceive of to add to the cost – really look lousy, and getting worse. The last quote from Florida Power & Light was that their next plant might cost $12 billion before they can even connect it to the grid. That's quite a mortgage for 40 years. Really expensive. Moonlight starts looking like an alternative at those prices, if those numbers are at all correct.

So this leads to two questions. Unfortunately, Mr. Blix, I was there when you said that you thought global warming actually was a worse problem than proliferation and nuclear terrorism. That was a few years ago. So I've got to ask the question again, how do you feel about that? Second –

BLIX: I remember that.

SOKOLSKI: I don't meet you often, but I remember you every time I meet you. (laughter)

Second, if you guys are convinced about the role of nuclear power, more power to you. But would you then be willing, because of your conviction, to at least allow it to compete without piling on more subsidies? Because a lot of these proposals – the Fuel Bank, underneath it, really is – at reasonable prices, as Ms. Clinton said, or Mr. Bush says, affordable prices. We know what that means.

And actually, it means also helping them with the reactors. If you look at some of the formulations of the Shultz/Perry/Nunn thing, they talk about, well, we've got to help them with the LWR.

By the way, one final comment. You guys may know what reprocessing and enrichment is – great, and I sort of do. But I gotta tell you, most people are either pro- or anti-nuke. They don't make these distinctions. And when you take a look at

countries that only had civil programs, and claimed they only had reactors, some of them got a bomb.

So the IAEA is not totally bulletproof against this problem set. I mean, there is a connection between nuclear power and bombs, which we are in denial about, and we keep sticking our finger in the socket like a five year old, to see whether we'll get electrocuted again. But the history is pretty bad. It's not great.

OK, that's it.

STETTEN: Well, a lot of questions from this table, and I think there were –

LAURENTI: This will be the last round here, so if there are any other comments?

STETTEN: If we have any other questions – yes, Mr. Butler?

BUTLER: Thank you very much for a pleasant lunch, and a very interesting discussion. Graham Allison, are you serious –

ALLISON: I'm sorry, who are you, Mr. Butler? (laughter)

BUTLER: My name is Richard Butler. Are you truly serious about this cartoon? Are you serious about that?

ALLISON: I think so.

BUTLER: Why? Why would that not be the case with anyone's nuclear weapon? Why is this a terrorist's nuclear weapon? I mean, what are you talking about?

ALLISON: Because –

BUTLER: The point I'm making is this. in your three points there, there is complete absence – complete absence of any injunction to any nuclear weapons states to reduce their nuclear weapons. It's nonsense.

You talk about the four horsemen. What's remarkable about them? It's not what they proposed. What they've proposed has been around for 15 years, starting with the Canberra Commission 12 years ago.

What's remarkable about them is that these old men – and God bless them – have decided to see the light before they die.

Now, why aren't you talking about the fundamental obscenity that anyone has nuclear weapons? Why aren't you talking about the fulfillment of the commitment by all nuclear weapons states to get rid of their nuclear weapons? Why are you presenting us with this ludicrous cartoon, talking about terrorism? The point is not about terrorism. The point is about the existence of nuclear weapons themselves, which are on seven-minute alerts, which could kill us all, and destroy the world's environment.

Why aren't you talking about that? Why do you make a fundamental assumption that our nuclear weapons are OK, but the other guy's are not?

Please address these questions.

STETTEN: Thank you very much for that, and I think we'll –

LAURENTI: Is there a last call? One more? Going twice?

STETTEN: So we give it back to the podium, last time, and we'll start with the American side of the table. Professor Allison?

ALLISON: Well, let me go in reverse order, starting with Richard's question, and then the others.

First, I did mention the Canberra Commission earlier –

BUTLER: Let's talk about the real issue.

ALLISON: No, no, I said – excuse me. I did mention this earlier. And I did say about the question of a fourth No – I don't know if you were here at that time –

BUTLER: (inaudible).

ALLISON: – that I say in the book that we should be about devaluing all states' nuclear weapons. We should be about CTBT, we should be about the fissile material cutoff, we should be about no first use, we should be about no new nuclear weapons, all of which seem to me to be near term ambitious – quite different than recent American policy, in near term issues – nearer term than the broader speech you want to give, I think, so that's point one.

Point two, if I ask myself why did Senator Kerry and President Bush and Sam Nunn and – now I would say for myself, why did we conclude that this cartoon, as you call it, is a greater immediate threat than the weapons that happen to be in the Chinese arsenal or the Russian arsenal or the U.S. arsenal?

It's because in the case in which a Russian weapon were launched against an American target, there's a pretty well established paradigm. It's called overwhelming retaliation, which would mean such an action would be suicidal. And that doesn't mean that this is a good world to live in, but in any case, I see the shape of that problem.

Whereas, in the case of Osama bin Laden, when I looked at the tape that he made after 9/11, and asked myself, would he be much more enthusiastic if he had succeeded in killing 300,000 people in one fell swoop, than the 3,000 he did, I think that he would. And I think he's extremely motivated.

Now, I agree, all of these things are connected. But I would say that the urgent face of nuclear danger today, the most urgent face – of which there are many, but the most urgent – is nuclear terrorism. At least, that's my view. And I understand that we disagree.

On Henry's question, I think – well, there is a bunch of questions, but I think your proposition about the wave is certainly right, and very important.

M: Which wave? The 30 foot wave, or the –

ALLISON: The first wave, which says that science and technology have made this – these obscene arsenals that were built about a Cold War more obviously obsolete. So military officers are not enthusiastically trying to hold onto this vast arsenal.

I would say the U.S. and Russia have actually made rather sharp cuts in weapons – have done a terrible job of marketing it, actually haven't marketed it at all. People don't even know it. And particularly, then, when the Bush administration declared disarmament to be a taboo – OK, now you get sort of a cacophony there.

On the economics of nuclear power, I think you and I may have a different view, and I agree, for any kind of energy, the question of cleaning out the subsidies that are part of the whole system is difficult to do. But if I –

M: (inaudible).

ALLISON: But if I look at the discussion that's going on Britain today, a bunch of utilities are talking about buying a new nuclear power plant. And if I look in China today, they've got 14 plants under construction.

They're not doing this – sorry –

M: (inaudible).

ALLISON: They're not doing it because they don't want energy. They – if I look at – so I'm – I say, I agree with you that we ought to be looking at the fundamental economics of the proposition, and that when you put in the cost of capital, and you put in the risk that's associated, now you're into a difficult space.

And the same way that when I notice that I'm dependent here in the U.S. on 12 million barrels a day to fix my energy addiction, I notice that this has something to do with my disposition of forces in the Gulf. So one thing connects to the other.

So I would say, that's on – on that one, I note – and on your, what people don't know about nukes, I agree with you. As I told you, there's more people believe in Elvis – Americans, at least.

On John's point, I think very, extremely interesting, and I haven't quite thought through it. But I think the proposition, especially coming off the recent period, only

bold U.S. actions at the outset would come to be credible, because most of the people who hang around these discussions are quite cynical about what they regard as American cynicism about earlier commitments, including the 13 steps at the 2000 NPT review.

And I think on the German ambassador's question, I agree with John's proposition that it's a combination of confrontation and cooperation. But I think we have a – actually, we don't get social science experiments in the policy world very often. But we have a pretty good one in the case of North Korea, in which we treated it one way for a while, and they had two bombs, and we treated them another way, and they have ten bombs. So I would say there is a lesson there.

STETTEN: Hans Blix.

BLIX: Thank you very much. Well, on the economics of nuclear power, if I go more deeply perhaps on Allison's view then, and Sokolski's, and we know that from the past. The Finns are building a big, new nuclear reactor. It's behind, it's also become more costly than it was projected but certainly without any subsidies.

And I think if you are worried about subsidies, then I think you should really look at how we are treating wind power and solar power. And if you go to moon power, I think even more so. (laughter)

And I think this has to do with simple physics. That if you're – I've been taught that one kilogram of wood will give you approximately a one kilowatt of electricity. If you go to oil or coal, you may get two or three kilowatts of electricity from one kilogram of oil or wood. If you go to uranium, one kilogram of uranium can give you 50,000 kilowatts of electricity. Going to plutonium, you get up into the millions. So it has something to do with physics, and the energy density of various materials.

Well, we will see. I am quite clear that –

M: I'm open to economic competition (overlapping conversations; inaudible) –

BLIX: I think it is – I think it's excellent. I think it's excellent. And I think you will have a great difficulty with wind power and solar power, and even a little bit more with moon power, as well. (laughter)

Now, jumping from that to the question of risk of proliferation. As I see it, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was concluded at the time when the world – when the nuclear weapons states were worried about a few industrial states. They were worried about Germany, and they were worried about Japan, they were worried about Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, etc. That was the first wave. They were not worried about Argentina or India or Pakistan and Israel.

Now, that was the second wave that came, and thereafter, we have had a third wave. We have had countries like Iraq, and Libya, and Iran, and North Korea.

Now, today, we can – if we look ten years ahead today, we can see that the nuclear technology will be even more available, on the Internet and everywhere. And the control of export is not going to work. So we need something else than this punitive approach.

And the path of the four horsemen, I think, is right. There is a screaming double standard in saying that, yes, we will have five licensed ones, and the rest – there will be another tier, and the rest will not be allowed to have any enrichment or anything at all.

And I think trying this is a necessity. We can't – we will not be able to control the spread of the knowledge and how to utilize it. So stopping gap that way, I think, is vital.

Now, my last point is about the point raised by the German ambassador about confrontational approach and the cooperative approach. And I was in front of a television camera at one time in the States, when they said that John Bolton has said that he doesn't do carrots. (laughter)

So my answer – for once, I found the answer was there. I wonder how he brings up his children. But when you come to economic pressures, it's a different matter. It's also a different matter legally, because Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the U.N. charter prohibits states to use a threat of use of force against territorial integrity and political independence of states. It doesn't speak about economic pressures, even bilateral economic pressures.

So I think that whether the Security Council adopts sanctions in the form of economic pressures, or you're having individual states using economic pressures, that's a different kind.

By and large, I think it is better with carrots than the sticks, and that's what has been used lately in the case of North Korea. But I wouldn't altogether rule it out.

But I think there is a tendency to say, hey, you must have both, there must be balance. But actually, you can also say that the absence of carrots is a form of sticks. You refrain from saying, you won't have this good if you don't/

So that's it.

STETTEN: Well, thank you very much. I give it to Jeff to thank the presenters. But I was just thinking, you know, we've talked so much about depression and medicine, and I wonder whether this is because we live in the world's capital of therapists, here in New York City, and have this discussion –

LAURENTI: And the upper East Side most of all. (laughter) On the plaques on the wall of the trustees of the Century Foundation over its 90-year history, you will see the name of Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer was not only a trustee here – more memorably, the father of the atomic bomb. And of course, one of his great acts of

contrition in life was, indeed, both the genius of that creation, and yet, the potential for ill.

And so, I think that when we consider where we head on weapons policies, Oppenheimer's own sense of redirection on that may be a useful model.

Thank you all for joining us. Thank you, Graham and Hans, for leading us in a very rich discussion today.